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Outrage au tribunal 
Some contemporary problems in the English law 
relating to contempt of court 
L. Neville BROWN * 
Introduction 
1. One day in 1970, a group of Welsh students, as a protest 
against a court order made against one of their student leaders, 
travelled to London from their University at Aberystwyth and invaded 
a courtroom in the Strand where Mr. Justice Lawton was hearing a 
case of libel wholly unconnected with their grievance. As Lord 
Denning vividly described the scene : "They strode into the well of the 
court. They flocked into the public gallery. They shouted slogans. 
They scattered pamphlets. They sang songs. They broke up the 
hearing." ' For their criminal contempt, eleven of the students were 
sentenced to three months' imprisonment and a further eight who 
apologised for their behaviour were each fined £50. The Court of 
Appeal upheld Mr. Justice Lawton's decision but, as an act of mercy, 
freed those students who had appealed against their sentences of 
imprisonment. 
2. A contemporary illustration of civil contempt, as opposed to 
criminal contempt, is afforded by the cause célèbre of Midland Cold 
Storage Limited v. Turner.1 In this case five unofficial dock leaders 
(who were shop stewards of the Transport and General Workers 
Union) had refused to obey an order of the National Industrial 
Relations Court against the continued picketing of the premises of a 
cold store in London which employed non-dockers to load and unload 
containers. The policy of the T.G.W.U. was that the work of loading 
* Professor of Comparative Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Birmingham. 
1. Morris v. Crown Office (1970) 2 Q.B. 114. The Welsh student movement has been 
concluding a vigorous campaign for the preservation of the Welsh language, including its 
equal use with English in court proceedings in Wales. 
2. Midland Cold Storage Limited v. Turner (1972) 3 A U E.R. 773 ; The Times July 22 and 
July 28 1972 (see also the leading articles on those dates). 
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and unloading containers carried by sea should generally be reserved 
for dockers. The Court ordered the five dockers to be imprisoned for 
civil contempt by reason of their disobedience to its order. There was 
then a threat of a total stoppage in the docks, but after a week the shop 
stewards were set free upon the application of the Official Solicitor. 
This deus ex machina persuaded the Court that under the relevant 
statute its orders should be enforced by measures against the Union's 
funds and not against individuals, at least in the particular circumstan-
ces of the case.3 
3. These two recent examples of criminal and civil contempt 
respectively show how relevant is the law of contempt to issues of 
contemporary society. The topicality of this area of English law is 
evidenced by the attention it has attracted in recent years. Thus, the 
organisation of British lawyers, Justice, issued a Report on Contempt 
of Court in 1959,4 which led to Parliament passing the Administration 
of Justice Act I960 so as to confer a right of appeal in cases of crimi-
nal contempt.5 In 1969 a government Committee under Lord Justice 
Salmon investigated the law of contempt as it affected Tribunals of 
Inquiry,6 an investigation prompted by public disquiet after the so-
called Vassal Tribunal in 1962 when three journalists were imprison-
ed for refusing^ to disclose their sources of information to the 
Tribunal.7 In 1971 the Lord Chancellor appointed a Committee under 
Lord Justice Phillimore to examine the whole law of contempt, and 
the report of this Committee is expected imminently. Indeed, refer-
ence will be made later in this paper to an informed "leak" of its 
main recommendations.8 Finally, in 1973 my colleagues in the 
Birmingham Institute of Judicial Administration, Gordon Borrie.and 
Nigel Lowe, published a major treatise on the modern law of 
3. Argument for the official Solicitor relied upon the judgment delivered the same day by the 
House of Lords in Heatons Transport (St. Helens) Ltd. v. Transport and General Workers 
Union (1972) 3 AII 'E.R. 101, where (at 108) Lord Wilbefore stated: "the method of 
enforcement The Industrial Relations Ad. 1971 prescribes, including expressly punishment 
for contempt, is against the organisation's funds. This is the method which has been 
adopted here: it appears to be the primary method contemplated by the Act, rather than 
any action against individuals". 
4. Justice, Report on Contempt of Court (1959). 
5. Section 13. 
6. Report of the Committee on the Law of Contempt as it affects Tribunals of Inquiry (1969), 
Cmnd. 4078. A few years previously Lord Justice Salmon had presided over a Royal 
Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, which reported in 1966 (Cmnd. 3121). 
7. Attorney-General v. Clough (1963) 1 Q.B. 773; Attorney-General v. Mulholland and 
Foster (1963) 2 Q.B. 477. 
8. The Sunday Times (1974), August 4, page 1. 
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contempt,9 thereby filling a gap in the doctrinal literature which had 
persisted since 1910 when the third and last edition appeared of 
Oswald's classic Contempt of Court.'0 
4. In this paper I have assumed, as a rough and ready generalisa-
tion, that the law of contempt is substantially identical in England and 
Canada, and that within Canada this identity persists as between the 
Francophonie and Anglophonic provinces. So much I learn from a 
study of the excellent teaching materials which professors Beausoleil, 
Ferland and Vachon provide for their students of Droit Judiciaire in 
the Laval Faculty. Such identity of our respective laws makes it 
unnecessary for me even to state here in outline the English law. 
Instead, I propose to discuss a selection of current problems and 
difficulties which have arisen in the English law and practice, being 
matters no doubt upon which the Phillimore Committee will shortly 
pronounce in its report. 
5. The four areas of difficulty and interest which I wish to 
consider relate to : (A) the uncertainty of the current law of contempt ; 
(B) the reconciliation ofthat law with the freedom of the press ; (C) the 
possible infringement of natural justice by the procedure followed in 
contempt cases; and, finally, (D) the search for a satisfactory 
classification of acts of contempt. In this last area, a comparison will 
be made with French law in an attempt to emphasise the generality of 
the English concept of contempt of court. 
A - Uncertainty of the law 
6. It has long been a complaint that there is uncertainty as to the 
moment of time at which the law of contempt begins to apply. This 
uncertainty usually arises in cases where the alleged contempt takes 
the form of a publication tending to prejudice the due course of civil or 
criminal proceedings." Publishers and editors of newspapers need to 
know when they must exercise restraint in commenting upon events of 
public concern because of an impending trial (or public enquiry). But 
the law gives no certain answer. The uncertainty is compounded by 
the distinction made between criminal and civil proceedings. 
7. So far as criminal proceedings are concerned, the law at the 
turn of the last century seemed to be settled that there could be no 
9. BORRIE AND LOWE, The Law of Contempt (Butterworths, 1973). I am heavily indebted to 
this work for much of my paper. 
10. OSWALD, Contempt of Court (3" edn., 1910). In 1927 an historical study was published by 
Sir John Fox: Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (1927). 
11. See BORRIE and LOWE, op. cit., Chapter 5, The Timing of Publications. 
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contempt unless at the time of the offending publication a criminal 
trial was pending n2 ; and by "pending" was meant that an arrest had 
been made or a warrant for arrest had been issued. This is illustrated 
by the Crippen case (1910) n , where the Daily Chronicle was adjudged 
guilty of contempt for publishing an alleged confession by the 
notorious murderer after his arrest on board ship in Canadian waters, 
but three weeks before he was formally charged in London with 
murder. 
8. In 1927, however, Lord Chief Justice Hewart appeared to 
draw a distinction between pending and "imminent" proceedings 
when he commented : "We are not called upon to consider the 
question whether there may be a contempt of court when proceedings 
are imminent but have not yet been launched." I4 And his successor, 
Lord Chief Justice Goddard, appeared to support the view that the law 
of contempt could begin to operate even before an arrest, when, in a 
case in 1957,15 he cited with approval the statement of Wills, J. : It is 
possible very effectually to poison the fountain of justice before it 
begins to flow."16 Parliament then lent apparent support to the 
distinction between pending and imminent when it enacted the 
Administration of Justice Act I960 which by section 11 provided : 
"A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he 
has published any matter calculated to interfere with the course of justice 
in connection with any proceedings pending or imminent at the time of 
publication if at that time (having taken all reasonable care) he did not 
know and had no reason to suspect that proceedings were pending, or that 
such proceedings were imminen,, as the case may be." 
9. In 1969 the Salmon Report was able to conclude : 
"Although there have been differences of opinion expressed on this subject 
the better view seems to be that as far as criminal proceedings are 
concerned the law of contempt bites when such proceedings are immi-
nent." " 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there is no authoritative ruling 
of an English court on this point. Moreover, the Phillimore Commit-
tee is expected, when it reports shortly, to adopt the criterion of 
"pending proceedings" and to define these as when a person has been 
charged or summon served. 
12. See /?. v. Parke 1903 2 K.B. 432. 
13. R. v. Clarke, exporte Crippen (1910), 22 7.L.R. 33 ; 103 L.L. 6363 
14. R. v. Daily Mirror, ex parte Smith (1927) ) 1.K. 848 at 858 
15. R. v. Odham's Press (1957) 1 Q.B. 77 at 81. 
16. R. v. Parke (1903) 2 K.B. 432 at 437. 
17. Cmnd. 4078, p. 9. 
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10. In civil proceedings the law of contempt begins to "bite" (to 
borrow the graphic phrase of the Salmon Committee) as soon as the 
writ has been issued. This was the view of Oswald in his book on 
Contempt and it was adopted with approval by Sargant J. in Dunn v. 
Bevan in 1922.18 In their recent book, Borrie and Lowe suggest that the 
criterion should be rather when proceedings are "imminent".19 On the 
other hand, the Phillimore Committee is expected to recommend the 
more restrictive rule that there can be no contempt until a civil case 
has been set down for trial. 
11. The Phillimore Committee by this recommendation will have 
found a solution for the problem of "gagging writs".20 A gagging writ 
is a writ issued for the specific purpose of stifling comment, rather 
than with any real intention of bringing any action. The writ is almost 
always one for libel. The problem then is whether its issue prevents 
("gags") any further comment being made, lest the comment be a 
contempt of court, even though there is no real intention of pursuing 
the action. 
12. Thus, in 1962 Sir Oswald Mosley brought libel proceedings 
against the B.B.C. in respect of an item broadcast in a television 
programme. The Statement of Claim was delivered in December 1962 
and the B.B.C. delivered its Defence in February 1963, but no further 
action was taken by the plaintiff. Then, in November 1965 the 
B.B.C.'s journal, Radio Times, published an article which reviewed a 
forthcoming programme entitled "The Thirties in Britain", and the 
plaintiff claimed that the article was prejudicial to the pending libel 
proceedings. His action for contempt against the B.B.C. failed, partly 
because the court held that he had no intention of pursuing the libel 
proceedings any further, as was evident from his inaction for over two 
years.21 
13. In practice, there have been fewer cases involving civil 
proceedings. The searchlight of publicity is usually focussed on 
criminal cases. Moreover, a civil trial by jury is only encountered 
today in suits for defamation. Consequently, it will be more difficult to 
establish that a publication has prejudiced a civil trial by judge 
alone, for the professional judge is trained to immunise himself 
against the effects of prejudicial comment. Yet in a recent case 
involving civil proceedings, a newspaper was prevented from publish-
ing an article on the ground that it would tend to deter one of the 
18. (1922) Ich. 276 at 284. 
19. BORRIEand LOWE, op. cit,, p. 148. 
20. BORRIE and LOWE, op. cit,, pp. 90-96. 
21. R. v. Fox, exporte Mosley (1966), The Times, February 17. 
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parties from defending the action.22 The case involved the tragic 
victims of the thalidomide drug on whose behalf a number of actions 
for damages were pending against the Distillers Company on the 
ground of their negligence in putting the drug on the market. Whilst 
négociations were in process to reach a settlement of the cases, the 
Sunday Times proposed to publish an article which, it was alleged, 
would establish the negligence of the company. The House of Lords 
held that this amounted to a contempt of court, as the newspaper 
intented to hold up to execration one of the parties to litigation and 
to conduct its own "trial by newspaper" of the issues in a parties to 
to conduct its own "trial by newspaper" of the issues in a pending 
case, with the object of bringing pressure on one of the parties to settle 
the case rather than to defend it. 
14. The implications of this decision of the House of Lords in 
relation to freedom of the press are far-reaching and will be returned to 
below. 
B - Freedom of the press 
15. The setting up of the Phillimore Committee in 1971 was 
largely prompted by concern that the law of contempt unduly 
inhibited freedom of the press. Mention has already been made of the 
imprisonment of three journalists for refusing to disclose their sources 
of information to the Vassall Tribunal.23 Anxiety also arose in 
connection with another Tribunal of Inquiry, that which inquired into 
a landslip of colliery waste onto the Welsh village of Aberfan in 1966. 
Immediately after Parliament had set up the Aberfan Tribunal the 
then Attorney-General, Sir Elwyn Jones, issued the following state-
ment :24 
"The Tribunal having been established with wide terms of reference, it is 
highly undesirable that any comments should be made either in the. Press 
or on the radio or on television on matters which it wiil be the express 
function of the Tribunal to investigate. 
Apart from their manifest undesirability, such comments may have 
legal consequences which are, perhaps, not at present appreciated. Just as 
comments on the subject matter of a pending trial may constitute 
contempt of court, so also, the Tribunal would have to consider whether 
such comments amounted to such an interference with their highly 
important task as to necessitate the chairman certifying that it called for 
22. Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers (\9Ti) 3 1ll E.R. 54(H.L.). 
23. Attorney-General v. Clough (1963) 1 Q.B. 773; Attorney-General v. Mulholland and 
Foster (1963) 2 Q.B. 477. 
24. H.C. DEBS Vol 734, Col. 1315 — October 27, 1966. 
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an investigation by the High Court as whether there had been a contempt 
of the Tribunal." 
16. This statement created much concern to the Press and other 
media. The Press Council expressed alarm at the implications of the 
Attorney-General's statement and commented that "the intrusion into 
the domain of free speech of ill-defined threats of legal proceedings is 
harmful to the proper conduct of public affairs in a free society." 25 
Nevertheless, the Salmon Committee concluded in its report in 1969 
that the Attorney-General had correctly stated the legal position, in 
applying the law of constructive contempt to Tribunals of Inquiry.26 
17. Another episode which alarmed the upholders of free speech 
was the Savundra case in 1968.27 Dr. Savundra appealed to the Court 
of Appeal against his conviction on the ground that his trial had been 
prejudiced by a television interview with him conducted by David 
Frost shortly before his arrest. The Court of Appeal dismissed the 
appeal as there was no real risk that the jury had been influenced by 
the interview, but Lord Justice Salmon made clear that such interviews 
would in future be punished for contempt even though proceedings 
were only imminent. 
18. Freedom of the press is an important safeguard of a free 
society. But such freedom cannot be allowed to degenerate into 
licence. A French jurist28 has remarked upon 
«la dégradation générale de la technique journalistique que l'on constate 
depuis quelques dizaines d'années, dégradation qui s'est étendue aussi à la 
radiodiffusion et à la télévision, dont les commentateurs se recrutent 
souvent parmi les journalistes. À la presse d'opinion, qui a pu jouer au 
XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle un rôle considérable dans la 
formation de l'opinion publique française, s'est substituée progressive-
ment une presse d'information, plus soucieuse de voir monter le tirage de 
ses quotidiens que d'éduquer le sens civique, politique et moral des 
lecteurs. Les vices de cette transformation sont graves: place de premier 
plan donnée aux faits divers, à l'érotisme, aux détails scabreux, aux 
affaires sensationnelles, affirmations faites à tort et à travers sur la 
culpabilité ou la non-culpabilité de telle personne poursuivie, blâmes plus 
ou moins fondés (et souvent moins que plus) sur l'activité judiciaire, 
influence anormale et partiale exercée sur l'opinion publique et, indirecte-
ment, sur les magistrats et sur les jurés des cours, d'assises. » 
Although addressed to the situation in France, these remarks ring true 
for much of the Western world. The law of contempt serves as a 
25. (1966), The Times, October 29. 
26. Cmnd. 4078, paras. 16-19. 
27. R. v. Savundraand Walker(\968)3 Al I E.R. 439 (C.A.). 
28. A. VITU, "Atteintes à l'autorité de la justice" Juris-Classeuu Pénal ( 1(19), p. p. 
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necessary check upon the abuse of the freedom of the press in the 
interests of administration of justice, interests which must rank as high 
as freedom of speech itself.29 
19. On the other hand, it is well to recall Lord Atkin's famous 
phrase that "Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to 
suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken, comments of 
ordinary men." 30 One wonders however what Lord Atkin would have 
thought of the comments which certain politicians made upon Sir 
John Donaldson, the Presiding Judge of the ill-fated and short-lived 
National Industrial Relations Court.31 
20. The Phillimore Committee is expected to clarify to some 
extent the difficult borderline between permissible public comment 
and contempt of court.32 It will propose that a publication should only 
be liable to prosecution for contempt if it creates a risk that the course 
of justice would be seriously impeded or prejudiced. In addition, it 
would be a defence that the publication formed part of legitimate 
discussion of matters of general public interest and that it only 
incidentally and unintentionally created the risk of serious prejudice to 
particular proceedings. But the Committee will reject the introduction 
into the law of contempt of a general defence that the publication is for 
public benefit. 
21. So far as concerns the new technique of "investigative 
journalism" or "trial by newspaper", the decision of the House of 
Lords in the Thalidomide case stands as a warning that the English 
law of contempt is adequate to restrain its excesses.33 However, the 
29. "The Press plays a vital part in the administration of justice. It is the watchdog to see that 
every trial is conducted fairly, openly and above board But the watchdog may 
sometimes break loose and have to be punished for misbehaviour" : DENNING, Road to 
Justice (1955), p. 78. 
30. Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago (1936) A.C. 322 at 335. 
31. In particular, Mr. Michael Foot, a Minister in the Labour Government of Mr. Harold 
Wilson after the election of February 1974, referred to the Judge as "trigger-happy" in his 
attitude to the Trade Unions. But his remarks (in December 1973) were made in the House 
of Commons within the shelter of parliamentary privilege, though it is a moot point how far 
this would project in contempt proceedings. 
32. See note 8 above. 
33. Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers (1963) 3 All E.R. 54 (H.L.). see especially the 
speech of Lord Simon at 81 : 
"Your Lordships, then, are concerned with two public interests, which are liable to conflict 
in particular situations — in freedom of discussion, on the one hand, and in unimpeded 
settlement of disputes according to law, on the other The public interest in freedom of 
discussion (of which the freedom of the press is one aspect) stems from the requirement that 
members of a democratic society should be sufficiently informed that they may influence 
intelligently the decisions which may affect themselves. The public thus has a permanent 
interest in the general administration of justice and the general course of the law. This is 
recognised by justice being openly administered and its proceedings freely reported, by 
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Phillimore Committee is expected to propose a new statutory 
provision whereby it shall not be a contempt to bring influence or 
pressure to bear upon a party to proceedings unless it amounts to 
intimidation or unlawful threats to his person, property or reputation. 
C - Contempt and Natural Justice 
22. Where contempt is committed in the face of the court, 
English law recognises an inherent power in the higher courts to 
proceed by summary process to punish the contempt.34 Such power 
was felt to be essential to uphold the course of justice. Accordingly, 
the person committing the contempt could not claim his normal right 
at common law to be tried by jury in a situation where he was at risk of 
imprisonment. For so-called constructive contempts, i.e. those com-
mitted outside the court (such as publications tending to prejudice 
proceedings), summary process has also become to accepted method of 
trial, although trial by jury was a seldom used alternative until 1902, 
since which date it has fallen into desuetude.35 
23. The use of summary process is generally accepted as 
necessary in cases of contempt, both in the face of the court and outside 
the court. Indeed, it is the more readily accepted since in 1960 statute 
granted a general right of appeal to the Court of Appeal against all 
convictions for contempt.36 At the same time, judges have been 
properly scrupulous not to abuse the almost arbitrary power which 
summary process entrusts to them. As the then Master of the Rolls, 
Jessel, declared in 1877 :37 
"This jurisdiction of committ ing for contempt being practically arbitrary 
and unlimited should be most jealously and carefully watched, and 
public debate on the law and on its incidence. But, as regards particular litigation, society, 
through its political and legal institutions, has established the relevant law as a continuing 
code, and has further established special institutions (courts of law) to make the relevant 
decisions on the basis of such law. The public at large has delegated its decision-making 
in this sphere to its microcosm, the jury or judge. Since it would be contrary to the 
system for the remit to be recalled pendente lite, the paramount public interest pendente 
lite is that the legal proceedings should progress without interference." But Harry 
Street, "Could English Law Cope?" (1974) New Law Journal, 796, warns pertinently 
that in England the law of contempt would have inhibited the journalists Bernstein and 
Woodward of the Washington Post from exposing the Watergate affair because of 
pending charges against some of "the plumbers". 
34. See BORRIE and LOWE, op. cit. p. 254. 
35. R. v. Tibbits and Windusl (1902) I K.B. 77 was the last reported instance of a trial by jury 
for contempt. 
36. Administration of Justice Act 1960, section 13. 
37. Clements and Costa Rica Republic v. Erlanger (Mil), 46 L.J. Ch. 375 at 383. 
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exercised, if I may say so, with the greatest reluctance and the greatest 
anxiety on the part of the Judges to see whether there is no other mode 
which is not open to the objection of arbitrariness and which can be 
brought to bear upon the subject". 
24. Nearly a century later much the same language was used by 
the present Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, in the extraordinary 
case of Balogh v. St. Albans Crown Court (1974).38 Balogh has s alerk 
with a firm of solicitors and as part of his duties found himself having 
to attend a case about pornographic books being tried at St. Albans 
Crown Court by Mr. Justice Melford Stevenson. The case extended 
over several days and Balogh became bored. He decided to enliven the 
proceedings by releasing laughing gas into the air of the court-room. 
To this end he stole a cylinder of the gas from a hospital and climbed at 
night onto the roof of the court-house in order to locate the ventilating 
ducts into which to release the gas. Next day, before he could put his 
plan into effect, he aroused the suspicions of the court officers, the 
cylinder was discovered and the admitted his intentions, saying that he 
only meant to indulge in a pratical joke. When he was brought before 
Mr. Justice Melford Stevenson, the judge was not amused and 
sentenced him to 6 months imprisonment for contempt. On appeal to 
the Court of Appeal, the sentence was set aside on the ground that 
there had been no contempt committed in the circumstances, although 
Balogh would still have to stand trial for the theft of the cylinder. 
25. One reason for the cautious use of the summary process to 
commit for contempt is that it could be said to offend the principle of 
natural justice that a person should not be judge in his own cause : 
nemo iudex in causa sua. For the judge towards whom a contempt has 
been committed in his court then proceeds to be judge of that 
contempt. This simplistic view can be met by the argument that 
committal for contempt is not done to vindicate the judge personally 
but rather to assert the majesty and authority of the law. As was said 
by Chief Justice Abbott in 1821, "the power to commit has been 
vested in the Judges not for their personal protection, but for that of 
the public." 39 
26. Nevertheless, the summary process of committal can place 
the judge if not in the position of judging "his own cause", certainly in 
that of doubling the roles of prosecutor and judge, which is a position 
no less objectionable as contrary to natural justice. Thus, Lord 
Denning observed in the "Laughing Gas" case :40 
38. (1974) The Times, July 5. 
39. R. v. Davison (}S2l), 4 B. & Aid. 329 at 333; ;16 E.R. 958 aa 959. 
40. See note 38 above. 
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**But in all but urgent cases a judge should not take it on himself to move. 
He should leave it to the Attorney-General or the party aggrieved to move 
in accordance with the rules in order 52. The judge should not appear to be 
both prosecutor and judge — a role which did not become hint well." 
27. It is to meet this objection that Borrie and Lowe in their book 
propose that as a general rule the judge should not deal himself with a 
contempt committed in the face of his court but should refer the 
contemnor to another judge.41 This would also have the advantage of 
meeting the requirement in the European Convention on Human 
Rights whereby anyone accused of a criminal offence should have 
"adequate time and facilities for the preparation of this defence."42 
Some judicial support for changes of this nature can be found in the 
judgment of Lord Justice Lawton in the "Laughing Gas" case. 
28. It is recognised however that this more measured procedure 
might be too cumbersome for contempts of a relatively minor 
character where the judge before whom the contempt was commited 
should retain a limited power to commit for a short term of 
imprisonment or to impose a small fine. There might also be 
emergency situations where the trial judge would have to act 
summarily in order that the due course of justice was not frustrated. 
D - The problem of classification 
29. One final problem in the English law of contempt which 
merits comment, especially from a comparative viewpoint, is that of 
finding a satisfactory classification for the various categories of 
contempt. 
30. A basic distinction can be made, in the first place, between 
criminal and civil contempts. Criminal contempts are those which fall 
within the province of the criminal law, although they remain subject 
to many peculiarities of procedure and punishment when compared 
with ordinary crimes.43 On the other hand, civil contempts are not 
crimes but may be regarded rather as an adjunct or offshoot of the 
civil law. A civil contempt always involves the failure to comply with 
an order of the court. Whereas a criminal contempt is a public wrong, 
that is an affront to the public interest in the due administration of 
41. BORRIE and LOWE, op. cit., p. 376. 
42. Article 6 (3) (b). 
43. Criminal contempts are in turn sub-divided into ( 1 ) contempts in the face of the courtt and 
(2) contempts committed outside the court or "constructive" contempts. Under construc-
tive contempts fall (a) publications "scandalising" the court and (b) publications which tend 
to prejudice proceedings, whether criminal or civil. See BORRIE and LOWE, op. cit. passim. 
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justice, a civil contempt is basically a private wrong, that is a wrong 
done to the person who is entitled to the benefit of a court order. For 
example, the equitable remedies of an order for specific performance 
(e.g. to fulfil a contract) or an injunction (e.g. to desist from a tort) 
rely for their effectiveness on the law of civil contempt, under which 
the person disobeying the order or the injunction may be committed 
for contempt at the motion of the party in whose favour the order was 
made. At the same time, there has always been a punitive element in 
civil contempt, so that the contemnor may find himself committed to 
prison. 
31. To a comparative lawyer it may seem that the genius of the 
common law was to subsume criminal and civil contempts within the 
single category of contempt of court. In this the creators of the 
common law showed a remarkable economy of concepts, making the 
one concept of contempt cover so broad a field. Perhaps because of 
their historical emphasis on procedure and forms of action, that is on 
adjectival rather than substantive law, the common lawyers discerned 
the underlying unity beneath criminal and civil contempts : that both 
serve to uphold the due administration of justice. The former ensure 
that the courts may despatch their business in good order and without 
let or hindrance ; the latter ensure that the authority of the courts is 
not undermined by disobedience to their solemn commands. 
32. In this respect, French law appears to offer an interesting 
contrast with English law. For French law does not seem to have 
evolved to the same degree of generalisation but still to be compart-
mented into separate categories. Indeed, the French law of contempt 
is no more than a law of criminal contempts (of various categories). 
The enforcement of court orders in France is not a matter for the law 
of contempt at all but rather a topic within the law of civil procedure, 
namely, l'exécution des jugements. Only in the complicated technique 
of the astreinte, which is a device to compel obedience to a court 
judgment rather than to compensate the judgment creditor, has 
French law fumbled its way to a pale counterpart of the English civil 
contempt.44 
33. As for criminal contempts, a French lawyer might arrange 
these under four heads. The first head would deal with the provisions 
of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to la police de l'audience, ,nd 
44. See Nicole CATALA, Astreintes in French Law", Juridical Review (1959), 163 and (1961), 
53. 
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les pouvoirs à l'audience du président ;45 or, since 1972, the new 
provisions in the reforming legislation of 1971/72, which refer to 
l'obligation de réserver et de garder une attitude digne, imposée aux 
personnes assistant à l audience.46 A second head would concern the 
similar powers which the Code of Criminal Procedure confers on the 
presiding judge to maintain order and control the proceedings in the 
criminal courts.47 A third head would contain the two specific criminal 
offences set out in the Penal Code, namely, l'outrage à magistrat, and 
les atteintes à l'autorité de la justice. 
34. L'outrage is extensively defined in the relevant texts (Articles 
222, 223 and 224 of the Penal Code) so as to cover contempts both 
within and without the court and in respect not only of a judge but also 
of jurors and court officials.48 The concept of "outrage" seems broad 
enough to correspond with what in English law would constitute direct 
contempts in the face of the court as well as indirect (or constructive) 
contempts such as comments "scandalising the court" or prejudicial 
to the course of justice. Publications generally, however, are a matter 
either for the French law of criminal libel under the Press Law of 
1881,49 or they may now fall within the new offences of atteintes à 
l'autorité de la justice introduced into the Penal Code by the notorious 
Ordinance of 23 December 1958.50 
35. These offences are to be found in articles 226 and 227 of the 
Penal Code, and are two-fold. The first is defined by article 226 as a 
"publication throwing discredit on any act or decision of a court dans 
les conditions de nature à porter atteinte à l'autorité de la justice ou à 
son indépendance." The publication may be by writing or word of 
45. Before the reforms of 1971-72 in relation to civil procedure, the relevant texts were Code of 
Civil Procedure, art. 10, 11 and 12 (concerning Tribunaux d'Instance) and art. 88 to 92 
(concerning Tribunaux de Grande Instance). These provisions have been abrogated by 
Decree No. 71-140 of 9 September 1971 (which imposes an "obligation of reserve" on the 
parties to proceedings), Law No. 72-626 of 5 July 1972, and Decree No. 72-684 of 20 July 
1972. 
46. Art. 87 of Decree No. 72-684 of 20 July 1972. 
47. The relevant texts are (for the Court of Assize) Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 306 to 
322, and notably art. 321 and 322, under which the President has the power to have anyone 
removed who disturbs the proceedings; he also has a wide discretion in the conduct of the 
proceedings. In the Tribunal correctionnel, see art. 404 and 405; and in the Tribunal de 
police the same articles appear to govern. 
48. See Henri BLIN, "Outrages envers les magistrats, jurés, les officiers ministériels et les 
commandants et agents de la force publique," Juris-Classeur Pénal (1974), commentary on 
Penal Code, art. 222 to 225. 
49. Law of 28 July 1881, art 31 and 33 ; see Henry BLIN, op. cit., paras, 138 et seq. 
50. See A. VITU, "Atteintes à l'autorité de la justice" Juris-Classeur Pénal (\96i,, commentary 
on Penal Code, art. 226 and 227. 
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mouth, or it may be any "act" done publicly, such as a demonstration 
or carnival procession. 
36. The second offence is defined by article 227 as the publica-
tion, before the final decision of a court, of comments tending to bring 
pressure on the statements of witnesses or on the decision of the 
investigating or trial court. 
37. If one compares these last offences with English law, they 
correspond broadly to what in England might be treated as a 
publication prejudicial to the conduct of civil or criminal proceedings 
and therefore a constructive contempt of court. The offence under 
article 226 also resembles what in some circumstances would be 
treated as a contempt for "scandalising the court". The language of 
article 227 would seem apt to inhibit the worst excesses of "trial by 
newspaper", but it is doubtful whether the French courts would ever 
give it so extensive an interpretation as to match the decision of the 
House of Lords in the Thalidomide case.51 
38. A fourth and final head to complete the assorted provisions of 
French law would be devoted to the special procedure in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure relating to offences committed at any court 
hearing (articles 675 to 678). Such ''''infractions commises à l'au-
dience" are to be distinguished from "délits d'audience" but may 
properly be considered to amount to a ceontempts of court. 
Examples would be the picking of a pocket in the courtroom or 
the coming to blows of two membres of the public. 
Conclusion 
39. The English law of contempt is adjudged by Borrie and Lowe 
to be fundamentally sound. They suggest only relatively minor 
reforms. It seems likely that the Phillimore Committee will endorse 
this academic assessment. Yet at a time when every institution in 
Britain is being subject to critical reappraisal the courts of justice must 
be especially vigilant not to attract the charge of being unable to adapt 
themselves to the changing times. Abuse of the law of contempt to 
uphold an outmoded atmosphere of holiness in the temple" or to 
stifle all criticism, however justified, of the administration of justice is 
a very real danger at the present day. On the other hand, politicians do 
the courts, and also the public, a grave disservice when they impose 
51. Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers (1963) 3 Al 1 E.R. 54(H.L.). 
51a. See D. J. HERMANN, Contemp: : Sacrilege in the Judicial Temple — The Derivative 
Political Trial (1972) 60 Kentucky L. J 565. 
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upon the judiciary tasks that bring them into the centre of the political 
arena, as in the ill-fated attempt (now abandoned) to force industrial 
relations into a legal strait-jacket.52 
40. To conclude, no better summary of the raison d'être of the 
law of contempt can be found than that with which Lord Diplock 
began his speech in the Thalidomide case : " 
"My Lords, in any civilised society it is a function of government to 
maintain courts of law to which its citizens can have access for the 
impartial decisions of disputes as to their legal rights and obligations 
towards one another individually and towards the state as representing 
society as a whole. The provision of such a system for the administration 
of justice by courts of law and the maintenance of public confidence in it 
are essential if citizens are to live together in peaceful association with one 
another. "Contempt of court" is a generic term descriptive of conduct in 
relation to particular proceedings in a court of law which tends to 
undermine that system or to inhibit citizens from availing themselves of it 
for the settlement of their disputes." 
52. Politicians do an even greater disservice to the cause of justice when, for the sake of party 
advantage, they then proceed to castigate the judges for becoming involved in politics: see, 
for exemple, Mr. Micheal Foot's sneer at the President of the National Industrial Relations 
Court as "trigger-happy" (see note 31 above). 
53. Attorney-General'v. Times Newspapers (1973)3 Al l E.R.54at71. 
